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Abstract 
Administrative systems have historically always been confronted with issues of 
integration and coordination on the one hand and autonomy and fragmentation on the 
other hand. The main topic of this paper is the challenge Norway and France face in 
coordinating specialized government activities after ten years of comprehensive reforms. 
We will consider the transformation of the French and Norwegian administrative 
architecture brought about by the reforms since the early 2000s and the choices the two 
countries have made with respect to multi-level governance. The focus is on the tension 
between territorial and sectoral specialization and between vertical and horizontal 
specialization as well as on how coordination has been reintroduced by hierarchy and 
other means. We describe both sector-specific administrative reforms and more 
overarching general administrative reforms, looking at similarities and differences in the 
reorganization choices made by the two countries and also at what drives change. We 
argue that a combination of factors are required to explain outcomes rather than either-
or explanations These factors include not only home-grown reforms, but also sectoral 
challenges, diffusion and learning from abroad, adaptation to the financial crisis and 
budget deficit and the free choices made by powerful political executives. Sometimes 
these factors work together and reinforce each other, producing radical reforms; at 
other times they have a mutually constraining influence, resulting in only minor changes. 
Empirical reality in various countries thus offers a marked contrast to all-encompassing 
ideas like "generic" public management, "global recipes" and simple models of 
administrative reforms.  
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Sammendrag 
Administrative system har alltid stått overfor spenninger mellom på den ene side 
integrering og samordning og på den andre side autonomi og fragmentering. 
Hovedtemaet i dette notatet er de utfordringer som Norge og Frankrike møter når det 
gjelder å samordne spesialiserte statlige aktiviteter etter ti år med omfattende reformer. 
Vi fokuserer på ombyggingen av den norske og franske administrative arkitekturen 
gjennom en rekke reformer siden tidlig på 2000 tallet og hvilke valg som er gjort når det 
gjelder flernivå-styring. Spenningen mellom territoriell og sektoriell spesialisering og 
mellom vertikal og horisontal spesialisering står sentralt samtidig som 
oppmerksomheten rettes mot hvordan man tar ulike samordningsformer i bruk. Vi 
beskriver både likheter og forskjeller i sektorspesifikke forvaltningsreformer og mer 
overgripende generelle reformer samtidig som de drivkrefter som ligger bak endringene 
analyseres. Vårt argument er at en-faktor forklaringer er utilstrekkelig og at det er behov 
for å kombinere flere forhold for å forstå reformprosessene. Reformene kan ikke bare 
forstås som hjemmelagede, men også sektorielle utfordringer, diffusjon og læring fra 
utlandet, tilpasning til finanskrise og budsjettunderskudd og bevisste valg fra et sterkt 
politisk lederskap påvirker innholdet i reformene. Noen ganger virker slike faktorer 
sammen og produserer radikale reformer, men i andre tilfelle kan de motvirke hverandre 
og føre til bare mindre endringer. Det er imidlertid klare forskjeller mellom landene i 
hvor viktig de ulike faktorene er. De empiriske realitetene i de to landene representerer 
en klar kontrast til globale oppskrifter, likeretting og konvergens mot enkle og 
sammenfallende administrative modeller.  
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Introduction 
Administrative systems have historically always been confronted with issues of 
integration and coordination on the one hand and autonomy and fragmentation on the 
other. The main topic of this paper is the challenge Norway and France face in 
coordinating specialized government activities after ten years of comprehensive reforms. 
We will consider the transformation of the French and Norwegian administrative 
architecture brought about by the reforms since the early 2000s and the choices the two 
countries have made with respect to multi-level governance. The French and Norwegian 
states are fundamentally organized according to territory and sector (Wollmann and 
Bouckaert 2006) but also include vertical and horizontal specialization and coordination 
by hierarchy, networks and various forms of standardization.  
The New Public Management movement that became dominant internationally from 
the 1980s challenged these principles and the related organizational forms of 
contemporary government administrations. The introduction of the NPM principles of 
greater autonomy, fragmentation, disaggregation and proliferation of public 
administration (Lægreid and Verhoest 2010) increased the cross-sectoral challenges 
facing states and changed modes of control. NPM reforms addressed mainly vertical 
specialization (structural devolution) and horizontal specialization (single-purpose 
organizations) but had little to offer to solve the much bigger problem of horizontal 
coordination. This flaw triggered a second wave of administrative redesign that began in 
the late 1990s, ushering in what is sometimes known as the "post-NPM" era. This 
second wave of structural reforms addressed central control and horizontal coordination 
issues and set about introducing more integration into public sector organizations via 
various forms of mergers or cooperative arrangements (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, 
2010a).  
This paper considers those issues by illustrating how the reorganization of the 
French and Norwegian government administration has addressed such challenges over 
the past ten years. We look at the tensions between territorial and sectoral specialization 
and vertical and horizontal specialization and examine how coordination can be restored 
by hierarchy and other means. We describe both sector-specific administrative reforms 
and more overarching general administrative reforms. The first type of reform is more 
typical for Norway while the second is more common in France. As a prelude to the 
discussion we look at the historical administrative legacy of the two countries. We then 
go on to describe similarities and differences in reorganization choices, and to consider 
what factors drive change. Our argument is that different reform trends tend to 
complement or supplement one another rather than a new set of reforms replacing the 
previous ones.  
We suggest that the historical similarities and differences in the two countries’ 
institutional arrangements go some way to explaining why similar problems of 
integration/coordination have arisen in both countries but also why some major 
differences exist and why they have been tackled in different ways. In France, the issues 
were diagnosed in the early 1990s and the influence of NPM has gradually increased 
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since the late 1980s (Bezes 2009). However, it is only in the past decade that 
transformative reforms have adopted as budgetary pressures have increased and 
following President Nicolas Sarkozy’s launch of a "General Review of Public Policies" 
(RGPP). Norway was for a long time a reluctant NPM reformer, but the reform process 
gained pace from the mid-1990s onward and peaked in the 2001–2005 period. The 
centre-left majority coalition that came to power in 2005 showed less enthusiasm for 
NPM, leading to a stalling of reforms and a change of direction towards post-NPM. 
This paper addresses the following questions:  
o What have been the main specialization and coordination / integration issues in 
France and Norway since 2000? Which solutions have the two countries 
adopted? What were the differences and similarities?  
o Why have successive governments in both countries addressed these reform 
issues? What role have the financial crisis, international reform trends, the 
historical administrative and cultural legacy, changes in the political leadership 
and policy problems in specific sectors played? 
o The paper focuses on reform at the central and regional levels but does not 
address reforms at the local and municipal level. We will first present our 
theoretical approach. Then we will describe the polity features and reform 
history of France and Norway. Thirdly, we will describe contemporary reforms 
in the two countries. Fourthly, we will explain the reform trajectories by 
examining the importance of different driving forces. Finally, we will draw some 
conclusions and implications. 
Theoretical approach  
An  i n s t i t u t i ona l  app r oa ch  ba sed  on  o r gan i z a t i on  
t heo r y  
The theoretical departure of this paper is an organizational perspective based on the 
concept of bounded rationality and an institutional approach informed by organization 
theory (Egeberg 2003, Olsen 2010). An organizational perspective presumes that one 
has to study how the public sector is organized in order to understand how it works. It 
makes a difference whether central government is an integrated system under ministerial 
responsibility or a disintegrated system of autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies, 
how it is coordinated vertically and horizontally, and whether it is specialized according 
to the principle of geography, process, purpose or clientele (Gulick 1937).  
Essential elements in this reasoning are concepts such as coordination, specialization, 
integration and autonomy. There are generally three criteria for recognizing integration 
between units: their interdependence, consistency and structural connectedness (March 
1999). The question of balance between integration and autonomy is a general problem 
in all multi-level systems (Olsen 2005). In this paper we focus on how this interplay is 
affected by the various forms of specialization and coordination mechanisms. We 
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describe the process of transformation, try to understand the driving forces behind the 
changes and discuss some implications for unity and diversity in the public sector.  
This theoretical approach claims that the historical–institutional legacy of an 
administrative culture as well as polity features both have an independent effect on 
contemporary reform trajectories (March and Olsen 1989). But other factors are 
important as well, such as external financial pressure and an institutional environment 
eager to promote modern administrative doctrines. The power of and initiatives taken 
by the political executive as well as sector- and task-specific challenges also have a role 
to play (Christensen and Lægreid 2007, Christensen et al. 2004). 
Spec i a l i z a t i on   
We will distinguish here between specialization by purpose/task/sector and 
specialization by territory/area/geography (Gulick 1937) as well as between vertical and 
horizontal specialization. Different specialization principles will foster different 
networks, identities and conflict patterns. An organization specialized according to 
geographical area will encourage policy makers to pay attention primarily to particular 
territorial concerns. Sectoral specialization has a tendency to weaken relations that have 
been developed territorially, for example with geographically-based units such as 
prefects, and to strengthen policy standardization across territorial units. Redesigning 
sectorally specialized organizations into geographically structured ones would thus tend 
to transform functional conflicts into territorial conflicts (Egeberg 2001, 2004). 
Generally, more specialization results in an increased need for coordination (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004), but which specialization principle is chosen will have a considerable 
impact on the choice of coordination mechanisms.  
One question, therefore, is whether the same specialization principle shall apply at 
both central and regional levels or whether these principles can be at variance. Another 
question concerns the implications this may have for multi-level coordination as well as 
internal coordination at different levels. Will a central government organized by sector 
and regional governments organized by area imply weak vertical coordination between 
the central and regional levels while horizontal coordination within regional government 
is well-established? Will this present a challenge to integration between the two levels of 
government resulting in the need for new coordination measures designed to counteract 
the consequences of autonomy?  
By vertical specialization we mean differentiation of responsibility on hierarchical levels, 
describing how political and administrative tasks and authority are allocated between 
forms of affiliation (Lægreid et al. 2010). Vertical specialization can take the form of 
structural devolution, autonomization or agencification, meaning the transfer of 
responsibility from units close to the political leadership to units that are further away 
from the political executive. Vertical de-specialization implies movement in the opposite 
direction – i.e., moving responsibilities closer to the political leadership. By horizontal 
specialization we mean the splitting of organizations at the same administrative level, for 
example splitting a ministry into several ministries. Horizontal specialization focuses on 
how tasks and authorities are allocated between organizations at the same hierarchical 
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level, for example between ministerial areas. Horizontal de-specialization implies merging 
organizations at the same administrative level. 
We will argue that there is a link between these two forms of specialization. 
Administrative systems scoring high on vertical specialization are often also strongly 
specialized by task or sector while systems scoring high on horizontal specialization tend 
to give more emphasis to territorial modes of specialization (Table 1). Often one comes 
across combinations of these two dimensions, but a low level of specialization implying 
a high degree of integration is rather rare in complex modern political–administrative 
systems. What is more common is simultaneous strong vertical and horizontal 
specialization, producing what we would argue is a multi-level system with a dynamic of 
its own. One reason for this is that formal organizational structure creates identities. 
Actors acting on behalf of organizations do so according to "a logic of appropriateness" 
(March and Olsen 1989). Parallel organizational structures at central and local level may 
create the same appropriateness at both levels and are therefore important if common 
identities among decision-makers at different levels are desired. The mutual trust that 
common identities offer may be very significant for maintaining an acceptable balance 
between integration and autonomy in a multi-level system. Parallel structures make it 
easy for central ministerial actors to establish contact with their local/regional level 
counterparts who are responsible for implementation.  
Table 1: Different forms of specialization 
Vertical specialization  
Strong Weak 
Strong Multi-level system: Specialization by 
territory and tasks 
Specialization by 
territory 
Horizontal 
specialization 
Weak Specialization by sector/tasks Integrated system 
Given our theoretical departure, we will argue that sector-based organizational 
structures at both levels that engage in formal as well as informal communication are 
important for establishing mutual trust between administrative levels. One important 
question is whether new organizational forms characterized less by parallel structures 
will lead to a loss of common identity and trust between administrative levels.  
Coo rd i n a t i on  
Vertical coordination is concerned with the coordination of various administrative 
levels, for example between ministries and subordinate authorities and between central 
and regional authorities Horizontal coordination concerns coordination between policy 
areas or sectors such as health, education, the environment, or public transport at the 
same level – be it the central, or regional level (Christensen and Lægreid 2008).  
In the debate about coordination one can distinguish between different principles or 
mechanisms of coordination (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010). These might 
include hierarchy – focusing on order, directions, and instruction; networks – focusing 
on persuasion, bargaining and mutual adjustments; and standardization of various kinds. 
There is also a distinction between positive and negative coordination (Scharpf 1997, 
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Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010). While negative coordination is a minimal form of 
coordination aiming at minimalizing conflicts, positive coordination is more holistic, 
focusing on building up coherent and integrated policies and means. Negative 
coordination entails actors agreeing not to harm each other’s programs or policies, 
whereas positive coordination is more about actually working together. Even if 
coordination is generally seen as a good thing, the wish to coordinate is often greater 
than the wish to be coordinated. Everyone embraces coordination as long as it does not 
involve their own organization.  
The relative importance of these coordination mechanisms within administrative 
systems may vary over time and between different countries. One reason why a given 
coordination mechanism may become more or less important is a change in the 
principles of organizational specialization (Verhoerst and Bouckaert 2005). The 
relationship between specialization and coordination might follow a stimulus–response 
pattern (Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest 2010) and normally more specialization 
requires more coordination. 
Historical–Institutional Context and Polity Features 
In this section we will take a brief look at the history of sectoral and territorial 
specialization and modes of coordination in Norway and France.  
Sec t o r - ba sed  spe c i a l i z a t i on  and  modes  o f  
c oo rd i n a t i on  a t  t he  c en t r a l  l e ve l  
In Norway there is strong ministerial specialization. The relationships between 
parliament, ministers and central agencies are based on the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, meaning that the minister is responsible to Parliament for all activities 
within his or her policy area in the ministry as well as in subordinate state bodies. This 
implies that specialization by task or sector is strong in Norway with powerful line 
ministries and weak horizontal coordination between ministerial areas. The overarching 
ministries are generally weak with the exception of the Ministry of Finance, which is a 
strong inter-ministerial coordinator in the area of budgets and finance.  
The central government administration in Norway is organized into ministries and 
central agencies. The central government is divided into eighteen different ministerial 
areas, and there are about sixty-five central regulatory and executive agencies, many with 
subordinate regional branches. The central agencies have been core elements in the 
Norwegian central administration over the past 150 years. They are government entities 
subject to ministerial directions and directly subordinated to ministerial control. Norway 
has a decentralized system of central public administration in which ministries and 
central agencies have a high degree of managerial flexibility. The Norwegian system 
entails extensive delegation to agencies. Ministries mainly manage agencies through 
dialogue and discussion, which encompass both formal and informal elements. A main 
challenge in the Norwegian system is to find an appropriate balance between delegating 
responsibility and maintaining adequate systems of accountability and control. 
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The French government has been divided into an average of eighteen ministries and 
between four and thirty Delegated Ministries and State Secretariats subordinated to 
ministries. The 150 central general directorates form the main structural framework of 
the French administration and function in "silos", albeit under the jurisdiction of 
changing ministerial portfolios (Quermonne 1991). Ministries and their directorates are 
deeply rooted sector-based organizations with strong ministerial cultures, embodied in 
the creation and growth of specialized corps of civil servants inside the ministries 
(Thoenig 1996) and the compartmentalization of the civil service statute which blocks 
the free movement of personnel across ministerial boundaries. The French state is thus 
organized according to a strong "ministerial logic" related to the historical development 
of sector-based ministerial organizations.  
Although legal forms of hierarchy dominate within sector-based ministries, the 
ministerial organization also relies on strong politicization mechanisms (Rouban 2004). 
The development of tighter links between ministers and senior bureaucrats within 
ministries via ministerial cabinets has provided a kind of top-down ministerial 
coordination mechanism. Ministries have historically established their own local units at 
the territorial level, thus undermining the prefects’ authority and their ability to integrate 
activities and increasing the need for coordination.  
In France there is a stronger horizontal specialization than in Norway but a more 
limited vertical specialization owing to strong mechanisms of administrative and (until 
1982) political centralization. The horizontal fragmentation is counter-balanced by the 
existence of several informal coordination mechanisms such as an inter-ministerial corps 
and some inter-ministerial administrative units. Under the Fifth Republic, the global 
inter-ministerial coordination is endorsed by the Prime Minister and the units directly 
subordinate to him or her.  
Te r r i t o r i a l  s pe c i a l i z a t i on  and  modes  o f  
c oo rd i na t i on  
In both countries, state territorial units and local authorities are organized according to 
the same territorial jurisdiction. However, many differences exist.  
In Norway there is a clearer separation between national and regional government 
than in France. There is a rather strong political decentralization to the municipal level 
and a weaker administrative decentralization. Norway is both politically and 
administratively rather decentralized at the regional level and has eighteen county 
councils elected directly by citizens and headed by a county mayor. It also has an 
administrative apparatus headed by the county executive. The role of county councils is 
contested in Norway, and was considerably diminished after they were deprived of 
responsibility for public hospitals in the hospital reform of 2002. They are now mainly 
responsible for high schools, regional roads, regional public transport, regional 
development and some cultural affairs.  
In addition to this political decentralization there is also an administrative 
decentralization to the county governor or prefect, who is the central government 
representative at the county level. He or she is responsible for overseeing the 
municipalities and for coordinating sector-specific branches of central government, such 
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as education, agriculture, health, environment, and regional planning at the regional 
level. He or she is also responsible for internal security and public safety. The 
organization of the regional level in Norway is further complicated by the fact that many 
ministerial areas have their own regional administration that cuts across the system of 
counties; there are, for instance, four different health regions, and separate regions for 
the police and the roads administration. The relationship between central, regional and 
local government is a mixture of political decentralization, based on the principle of local 
self government, and administrative decentralization based on the principle of delegated 
authority. Political control over the civil service has been general and passive, allowing 
the executive considerable leeway.  
In France, the system of geographical administrative organization created under 
Napoleon is rooted in a territorial design that is like a set of Russian dolls (départements, 
arrondissements, communes), with prefects and sub-prefects forming the main chain of 
command (Grémion 1976, IFSA 1978, Hayward and Wright 2002). The territorial 
administrative organization evolved from the 1960s onwards as newly created ministries 
established their own units at regional level undermining the prefects’ ability to integrate 
activities. The fact that sector-based ministries chose to spread themselves around the 
national territory in this way signifies their distrust of the policy principles upheld by the 
prefects and a desire to short-circuit them (Le Lidec 2006). 
The French administrative system is also characterized by strong interdependent 
relations between central and local government. France has 26 regions (only created in 
1982) and 102 départements. These authorities are separate independent entities not linked 
by subordination principles. Public policy can thus be said to be co-produced by the 
state and the local authorities with high coordination costs.  
Administrative decentralization is also stronger than in Norway, embodied by the 
existence of regional and départemental prefects as representatives of the state and 
government. The prefectoral structure provided the basis for developing mechanisms of 
central steering, resting on a uniform and territorial administrative model but combined 
with a political hierarchy where prefects were the integrative force at the local level. 
Prefects have played a dual role: legal supervision of local authorities like in the 
Norwegian case, but also representating the government cabinet face to state ministerial 
local units and local governments. Historically, this logic has been simultaneously 
hierarchical, political and territorial. Apart from its ministerial organization, the French 
state has been specialized according to the territorial principle. The prefect prioritizes 
the objectives of public policies according to the local context (Worms 1966).  
The large number of local authorities in France has historically raised many problems 
of coordination and has favoured the role of coordination by the prefects. However, 
decentralization policies introduced from the 1980s onwards have profoundly affected 
the centre’s capacity to control the conduct of public policy.  
Spec i a l i z a t i on  and  coo rd i na t i on :  s ome  compa ra t i v e  
r e f l e c t i on s  
Table 2 sums up some of the main differences and similarities between the Norwegian 
and French administrative system regarding specialization and coordination.  
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Norway has strong specialization by sector and a clear separation between central and 
local government. The dual principles of ministerial responsibility and local self-
government solve some coordination problems and produce others (Fimreite and 
Lægreid 2005). Positive sector-specific vertical coordination occurs within each 
ministerial area from central to local state level. Territorial coordination within each 
county municipality is also rather positive. The main coordination problem in the 
Norwegian political–administrative system is between ministerial areas and between 
political–administrative levels (state–local government). The political focus on a specific 
area of responsibility is strong, and consequently the challenges of coordination across 
ministerial areas are considerable, also at the political level. Norway has weaker prefects 
than France. 
Table 2: Comparing Administrative Systems  
 France Norway 
Global design Strong competition between two 
logics : territorial specialization 
and ministerial specialization + 
Shared responsibilities between 
the state and local government, 
specifically in some policy areas  
Strong tension between the principle 
of ministerial responsibility 
(specialization by sector) and the 
principle of local self-government 
(specialization by territory) 
Ministerial specialization  Extended vertical ministerial 
specialization: many ministries, 
many central administrations, 
many state local units 
Strong vertical specialization with 
small central administrations and 
numerous ministerial agencies 
Central coordination 
within the state 
Medium. Stronger Prime Minister, 
two strong transversal ministries 
(Interior and Budget) and a 
political driving belt at the 
territorial level to impose orders 
from the centre.  
Weak. Weak coordination between 
ministries with only the Financial 
Ministry as an overarching sectoral 
ministry. Strong silos due to 
ministerial agencies 
State territorial 
coordination 
(coordination at local 
level between state 
units) 
Medium. The French system has 
created a coordinator at the 
territorial level, the prefect. 
Conflicts between ministerial 
territorial units and the prefects 
Weak. The power of the prefect is 
weaker than the French one –
Conflicts between ministerial 
territorial units and the prefects 
Coordination at the 
central level between 
central government and 
regional authorities  
Weak coordination between 
strongly interdependent actors: 
state and local authorities do not 
negotiate with each other at 
central level 
Dialogue meetings. Coordination 
through revenue system based on 
objective criteria but also earmarked 
grants, sector-based law  
Coordination at 
territorial level between 
state units and local 
governments  
Positive coordination (although 
conflictual) owing to strong 
interdependencies and shared 
responsibilities. Each actor needs 
the other to succeed. Mediator role 
County governor has a mediator role 
as central government 
representative towards local 
government, and vice versa  
 
France is characterized by greater fragmentation at the centre and at the territorial level 
but has developed stronger coordination and integration mechanisms, especially at the 
local level (through the prefects). Inter-ministerial coordination has always been a 
problem and was accentuated by the absence of a stable, hierarchical national executive 
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in the person of a Prime Minister. Coordination is largely negative in the French system, 
taking the form of persistent compartmentalization, mutual avoidance and friction 
reduction between ministries (Hayward and Wright 2002, Bezes and Le Lidec 2011). 
Going back to Table 1, we will argue that Norway and France have both developed 
strong vertical specialization, but horizontal specialization is stronger in France than in 
Norway. Concerning the mode of coordination, both administrative systems have major 
problems of inter-ministerial coordination at central level owing to ministerial silos, 
although the French system seems to have more informal mechanisms offering a limited 
counter-balance. This coordination problem is also stronger at the regional level in 
Norway than in France because the Norwegian prefect has less power than the French 
one. However, the important horizontal specialization of the French administration at 
regional level, embodied in a large number of state local units, generates more 
fragmentation than the Norwegian pattern with a rather small central government and a 
limited number of agencies. The Norwegian administrative system is also characterized 
by a clear separation between central government and regional authorities, paradoxically 
generating fewer problems than the French interdependent system.  
Contemporary Reforms – Descriptions and 
Comparisons 
In this section we will address contemporary administrative reforms in France and 
Norway, focusing mainly on those that have taken place since 2000. For each country 
we will first describe some general modes of change. We will then discuss reforms that 
address the challenges of vertical specialization linked to sectoral specialization and the 
implications of these reforms for coordination. Third, we will address reforms designed 
to tackle the problem of horizontal specialization across ministerial areas and the 
challenges of territorial specialization and the implications of such reforms for 
coordination. Fourth, we will consider the relationship between central and regional 
government and the issue of political decentralization. Finally, we will draw some 
comparisons between the two countries along these lines. These dimensions are all 
linked to our theoretical concepts of specialization and coordination and reveal some 
interesting similarities and differences between the two countries. 
Norweg i an  r e f o rms  
The reform mode 
The NPM reforms in the Norwegian civil service started slowly in the late 1980s and 
gained momentum from the mid-1990s onwards (Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Olsen 
1996). The Norwegian approach to NPM reforms was pragmatic and espoused mainly 
the managerial tools of NPM: Management by Objectives and Results, increased 
structural differentiation of the roles and functions of government, structural devolution 
of agencies and state-owned companies and increased managerial autonomy. In the 
period 2001–2005, however, the Centre–Conservative government adopted some major 
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ideas from the NPM movement. After the centre–left government took office in 2005 
more program-oriented reforms focusing on specific policy areas were introduced. 
Some features of these reforms may be categorized as post-NPM.  
In the case of Norway we generally see dual processes of vertical specialization and 
horizontal de-specialization at work, especially in the 1990s (Lægreid et al. 2010). The 
general picture defines a movement of organizations further away from the central 
political authorities combined with mergers of similar types of organizations to increase 
coordination. This can be seen as a co-evolution of reform ideas and administrative 
practice producing hybrids and complex organizational solutions. 
The centre–left majority government that came to power in 2005 ran pretty much on 
an anti-NPM ticket arguing that NPM reforms should be stopped or modified because 
of their negative consequences, such as fragmentation, proliferation and reduced 
political control. This view was particularly interesting coming from the Labour Party, 
which had previously been seen as supporting NPM. A crucial question is whether the 
anti-NPM rhetoric actually resulted in major changes. Today’s administrative policy in 
Norway is ambiguous. It is fair to say that the pace of NPM has slowed down but has 
not been reversed. What we see are post-NPM features supplementing previous NPM 
reforms. The process of external devolution to state-owned companies has more or less 
stopped, the performance management system is still going strong and we see increased 
horizontal de-specialization. 
Vertical specialization and de-specialization – agencification and reassertion of 
the centre 
In the 1990s structural devolution became a major reform trend in the central 
administrative apparatus in Norway. The first dominant element was internal structural 
devolution – ordinary agencies were given more autonomy and new independent central 
agencies were established. Some organizations were also moved from central to regional 
government. Part of this structural devolution also took the form of granting regulatory 
agencies more formal autonomy than the ordinary agencies mentioned above. This was 
combined with an increase in horizontal specialization of the roles and tasks of agencies, 
according to the principle of "single-purpose organizations". There has, however, been 
an unstable balance between autonomy and control. Three examples illustrating these 
dilemmas will be given in the following. 
In 2001, a major reform of the central immigration administration took place in Norway. 
All responsibility for this policy field was gathered under the Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Affairs, moving the regulatory role away from the Ministry 
of Justice and Police. The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, established in 1988, 
was given more formal autonomy, and a new body was established with a lot of formal 
autonomy – the Immigration Appeals Board. The main motives behind the reform were 
to ease the capacity problems and burdens of the central political and administrative 
executive by hiving-off immigration cases, but it also involved a blame-avoidance 
component (Christensen and Lægreid 2009). After the reorganization, the political 
executive could no longer interfere in ordinary individual cases. Steering was to be done 
from a distance, via general policy directives, thus furthering professional autonomy.  
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After this reform was implemented it soon became clear that the minister was not 
satisfied with a situation where she carried responsibility for many immigration cases but 
had her hands tied in handling them. She therefore launched a reorganization process to 
exert more control. The new measures went into effect in 2005. Under the current Red–
Green government the control measures have been tightened still further (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2009). The latter efforts at reorganization and reasserting control do not 
seem to have reversed the main features of the first reform but they do represent an 
attempt to weaken some of the autonomy in the reform of the immigration 
administration. It represents a case where agencification or vertical specialization has 
been followed by re-centralization or vertical de-specialization.  
Another case for increased vertical specialization is related to regulatory agencies. In 
2003, the Conservative–Centre government proposed a regulatory agency reform inspired by 
the OECD model (Christensen and Lægreid 2007) that had two main components. One 
was a proposal for structural devolution that would make the regulatory agencies more 
independent and the role of a regulatory agency more specialized and less ambiguous. It 
was proposed that there should be a principle of non-interference from the political 
executive in individual cases dealt with by the regulatory agency; this was followed up by 
more detailed proposals for eight specific agencies. It was also proposed that appeal 
cases should be moved out of the ministries to independent appeal boards. The second 
main element was to relocate the chosen regulatory agencies, i.e. move them out of 
Oslo. After a tug-of-war between the minority government and the opposition a 
compromise was reached. The relocation was agreed on, but it was decided that the 
devolution principle should not be applied to all regulatory agencies and there should be 
no change with respect to appeal cases. The minister behind the proposal supported the 
NPM principles concerning structural devolution. He argued that politicians, central 
administrative leaders, interest groups and ad hoc groups should stay away from 
individual cases and that the relocation would ensure that this happened. 
A third reform addressing the issue of vertical specialization and de-specialization 
was the hospital reform. In 2002, responsibility for Norwegian hospitals was transferred 
from the counties to the central government. This vertical de-specialization is one of the 
biggest contemporary administrative reforms in Norway. The reform centralized the 
ownership function, and the Ministry of Health was given main overall responsibility, 
aided in administrative and oversight functions by two subordinate agencies. Five 
regional health enterprises with separate professional boards were established, 
comprising 33 local health enterprises overseeing 250 health institutions of different 
types. Responsibility for hospitals was moved from the county municipalities to a new 
administrative territorial arrangement subordinated to the line Ministry of Health. The 
goals of the reform were to enhance coordination and utilize resources more efficiently 
through better control of the financial situation of the hospitals. The reform process 
was an entrepreneurial political effort by the responsible minister.  
The case is an interesting example of administrative decentralization and political 
centralization (Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2005). The hospitals were removed from the 
ordinary public administration and transformed into enterprises which were supposed to 
have a lot of managerial autonomy. The central government, represented by the minister 
of health, took over the ownership function and established an ownership division in 
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the ministry. A small part of the hospital reform was reversed when the centre–left 
government came to power in 2005, because it brought politicians back onto the boards 
of hospitals. Overall the reform tilted the steering of the hospitals more in the direction 
of centralization, but this was balanced out by increased managerial autonomy of the 
hospitals. It created more bureaucracy, more control and more reporting in the hospitals 
enhanced by a sophisticated performance management system (Christensen, Lægreid 
and Stigen 2006). 
There has been a general trend towards increased agencification and vertical 
specialization, but especially in politically salient areas such as immigration, health and 
regulation it seems to be difficult for politicians to grant the agencies extended 
autonomy and abstain from political control and interference. An important issue in the 
Norwegian case has been the issue of political control and vertical coordination, which 
has been somehow undermined by increased vertical specialization, as illustrated by the 
immigration case. Vertical de-specialization was applied in sectors where local 
authorities (counties) manage policy (here, hospitals). This is a major difference to the 
French case where no recentralization from the local authorities to the state has 
occurred. 
Performance management: A way to control autonomous agencies? 
The emphasis on vertical specialization that the establishment of more autonomous 
agencies brought in Norway has generated a need for central government to regain 
control over them. This has been achieved mainly by introducing performance 
management systems using NPM recipes but also by a degree of re-centralization.  
The price the autonomous agencies have to pay for their increased autonomy is a 
tighter control and scrutiny system. In the early 1990s a system of performance 
management, Management-by-Objectives-and-Results (MBOR), was introduced and 
developed in Norway (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2008). A more formalized 
performance-assessment regime was established and made mandatory for all 
government organizations; it was integrated into the government Financial Regulations 
in 1996. This includes a Letter of Allocation which is a quasi contract-based 
arrangement between the parent ministry and the subordinate agencies concerning 
recourse, objectives and performance indicators. It is also assisted by a formal system of 
reporting and steering dialogue between the ministry and the agencies. Progress with 
government-wide systems of performance measurement has been slow, especially with 
respect to developing and using performance information. But many ministries and 
agencies have made a considerable effort to establish performance indicators and to 
implement performance reporting systems (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2008). In 
some sectors, mainly higher education and health, some funding is directly linked to 
results – with money following students or patients. The ownership function for 
hospitals is enacted largely through a performance-management system.  
Horizontal specialization and de-specialization – and coordination efforts 
From the mid-1990’s, Norway faced a two-fold process concerning the horizontal 
dimension of specialization. On the one hand, when different functions were fulfilled 
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within the same organization, reforms promoted horizontal specialization by splitting 
integrated government department services into single-purpose organizations. Typically 
separate bodies for regulation and scrutiny, for service delivery, for policy advice and for 
infrastructure were established.  
On the other hand, there was also a process of horizontal de-specialization going on 
whereby different organizations that fulfilled the same function or had similar tasks 
were merged. This concerned regulatory tasks, such as when five regulatory agencies 
were merged into a single regulatory food agency, and service provision tasks, such as 
when different types of higher education organization were merged into university 
colleges. This kind of horizontal de-specialization thus typically takes place internally 
within a ministerial portfolio and rather than externally across sectoral boundaries. Two 
examples illustrate this process, one of which was a success while the other failed, 
showing how difficult de-specialization can be.  
In 2005, a reform of the Norwegian Welfare Administration was approved by the 
Parliament. Together with the hospital reform, this reform turned out to be one of the 
biggest contemporary reforms in the Norwegian public administration. The 
implementation started in 2006 through a process aimed at lasting until 2010. The 
centre-piece of this reform was a merger of the employment administration, represented 
by the Directorate of Labour, and the National Insurance Administration into a single 
new labour and welfare agency, the NAV, represented on all levels. It was also decided 
that a new local frontline service should be organized – a one-stop shop – resulting 
from a new partnership between the NAV and locally based social services. This local 
partnership combined control and formalization with flexibility and variety (Fimreite 
and Lægreid 2009). In an unusual move it was the parliament (Storting) rather than the 
political or administrative executive that initiated this reform. Although controversial 
(Christensen, Fimreite and Lægreid 2007), the reform was successfully implemented in a 
two-step process that involved first merging the ministries and then the central agencies 
and their subordinate regional and local branches. 
The merger finally decided on was partial, since it did not fully include the social 
services; nevertheless, it was the largest sectoral merger ever undertaken in the 
Norwegian central administration, so the holistic aspect of the reform was central. On 
the central level, the NAV reform implied extensive horizontal de-specialization and has 
probably tilted the balance more in the direction of central control (Fimreite and 
Lægreid 2009). In some cases, however, the merger appeared to be politically sensitive 
and problematic.  
The case of internal security illustrates the difficulties of horizontal specialization. In 
1999, a process was launched to reorganize the central apparatus for internal security. A 
public commission assessed the vulnerability of Norwegian society and proposed ways 
to improve vertical and horizontal co-ordination in the security administration. The 
suggestion was to establish a new ministry of internal security that would merge the 
various agencies in charge of functions viewed as interdependent. These 
recommendations were not, however, approved by the government in the White Paper 
presented to parliament in 2002, and most of the bodies and actors involved refused to 
be merged into one organization. They all acknowledged the problems of fragmentation, 
weak co-ordination, and low priority assigned to internal security, but they failed to 
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reach agreement on a radical organizational merger. Somewhat surprisingly, the process 
resulted in only minor changes in the security administration (Lægreid and Serigstad 
2006). The compromise solution was to strengthen the coordinating responsibility of 
the Ministry of Justice by merging two agencies into a new Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning. The Ministry of Justice has gradually increased its 
cross-ministerial responsibility in this policy area, but it is still weak. The main principle 
of individual organizational responsibility for internal security based on sectoral 
specialization trumped the need for stronger horizontal coordination across ministerial 
areas. These two examples of recent cross-sector reform initiatives show that it is easier 
to achieve such integration within a ministerial portfolio than across ministerial areas. 
During the first term of the centre–left government elected in 2005 the problem of 
inter-ministerial coordination also became a higher priority on the political agenda. After 
the government was re-elected in 2009 the Prime Minister’s office was strengthened by 
the appointment of a special minister for inter-ministerial coordination. Having a 
minister without his own portfolio but with special responsibility for horizontal 
coordination was a new construction in the Norwegian central government.  
Decentralization: Attempt at regional reform ends in failure  
Significantly, another kind of vertical specialization, involving political decentralization 
combined with horizontal de-specialization, failed in Norway. When the centre–left 
government came to power in 2005, regional reform was high on its agenda and was a 
central element in the government declaration. The government wanted to merge the 
nineteen counties into five or six larger regions and to transfer responsibilities and tasks 
from central government to the new regions. The new regions were to be polities with 
their own elected politicians and councils.  
A regional reform was first and foremost important for the junior coalition partner, 
the Centre Party, which has traditionally strongly favoured decentralization. The major 
coalition partner, the Labour Party, however, was sceptical about this reform, having 
traditionally favoured centralization. Added to this, there was also strong opposition 
from powerful sector ministries. None of them were eager to decentralize tasks and 
responsibilities to the proposed new regions. The proposal also met with resistance 
from the administrative and political executive in the counties who were afraid of losing 
their responsibilities and positions if they were merged into five or six large regions. 
Another reason for opposition to the reform was that its proposal to simultaneously 
merge counties and decentralize was considered too ambitious. Instead of an extensive 
reform, the Norwegian government ended up keeping the nineteen counties as they 
were but delegated some additional tasks to them, such as responsibility for regional 
roads. The main purpose of the renewed counties is said to be regional development of 
all sorts. To sum up we can say that the regional reform tried to enhance territorial 
vertical specialization at the expense of sectoral specialization, but failed. 
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F r en ch  r e f o rms  
The reform mode 
Like in Norway, the influence of NPM recipes on administrative reforms in France 
increased gradually from the late 1980s but was only significant in transformative 
policies in the early 2000s (Bezes 2009, 2010). The first "managerial reform" was 
launched in 1989 in the form of a policy entitled "Public Service Renewal" (PSR). The 
modernization program valued service quality, user concerns, some managerial 
techniques and a continuing set of distinctive public service orientations with the strong 
participation of public servants. Experiments were favoured as the dominant style of 
reform. The reform attempts of the 1990s resulted from the competing initiatives of 
three major transversal ministries within the French state: Budget, Home Office and 
Civil Service (Bezes 2007, 2009). In sharp contrast to Norway, the French reforms were 
rather transversal and consisted of initiatives from the centre extending to all sector-
based ministries. In 2001, the reform of the French budget procedure systematically 
adopted many internationally dominant instruments of performance management and 
imposed them on ministries as a new mode of control. In 2007, the Fillon right-wing 
government and the newly elected President Sarkozy launched a General Review of 
Public Policies (RGPP) with explicit references to the Canadian Program Review 
initiated in 1995–1996. The RGPP claimed to be engaged in "rethinking the state" in 
response to the fiscal imperatives of state debt and the state deficit. A major program of 
mergers affecting all ministries was decided, concerning central administrations but also, 
even more systematically,  the territorial state and its ministerial local units.  
Since 2007, forms of horizontal de-specialization have been more systematically 
adopted at various levels (Bezes and Le Lidec 2009). The global picture shows 
politicians being generally rather reluctant to lose control by moving organizations 
further away. In the French context, horizontal de-specialization also seems to be 
associated with budgetary reductions, which are likely to be generated by mergers.  
Vertical specialization and de-specialization and the implications for coordination 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the process of agencification remained limited. On the 
one hand, newly created agencies were set up to respond to social or economic demands 
or to face the growing issues of risk regulation, often in crisis situations. The health 
sector has been the privileged site for the creation of agencies over the last few years, 
with the aim of ensuring that these bodies would be more independent of political 
control. On the other hand, new agencies were tasked with new functions and moved 
away from their initial ministries or institutions. New agencies were rare in the four key 
ministries of state (the Interior, Justice, Defence and Foreign Affairs), but numerous in 
Agriculture, Social Affairs, Culture and Research. The number of agencies increased 
considerably. The creation of agencies made the already fragmented organization of the 
state even more complex. This resulted in overlapping responsibilities and poor 
cooperation between agencies as well as between agencies and traditional state services.  
Another move towards increased vertical specialization was generated by the 2003–
2004 decentralization wave that transferred new competencies to the regional and 
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départemental levels. Owing to the two waves of decentralization, public policy is now 
mainly implemented by local authorities and not by the state. Contrary to Norway, no 
process of vertical de-specialization to central government occurred in the French case 
where decentralization policies have been the favourite reform route. However, a 
process of vertical de-specialization has taken place very recently within the French 
territorial state. The first emergence of this trend appeared for specific sector-based 
policies. In 1996, regional hospital agencies were developed with power of accreditation 
and the remit to merge public hospitals. Endowed with increased powers to control 
hospitals in 2003, these regulatory health care organizations are designed to reduce the 
autonomy of non-state actors and develop regulatory standards and contracts over 
hospitals (Hassenteufel 2008).  
Launched in 2003 but intensified in 2008, the reorganization of legal control over 
local authorities, traditionally exercised by sub-prefectures was transferred to prefectures 
at the départemental level with the creation of several inter-regional "back-office" agencies 
that grouped together highly qualified bureaucrats with professional expertise and 
extensive experience in law. More systematically, within the RGPP the process of 
vertical de-specialization was intensified in relation to another dominant horizontal de-
specialization movement through mergers at regional and départemental levels. It was 
decided to tighten the départemental organization of state services by merging units and 
creating three inter-ministerial directorates. The organizational change defines an 
implicit objective to significantly decrease the number of "front office agents" in local 
ministerial units at the departmental level. Several "back-office" agencies grouping 
together highly qualified bureaucrats with professional expertise were created at 
different levels. This achievement of vertical de-specialization by reducing the 
départemental level of the state organization has been gradual, and given that the 
départemental level has historically been the organizational choice for the French 
administration, it is likely to encounter resistance or indeed provoke a backlash.  
Vertical specialization and de-specialization within the French public administration 
have implications for coordination issues. Two types of coordination mechanism have 
been reactivated: one is the hierarchical, and the other, more important one, the 
political. On the one hand, a new hierarchy between administrative levels (regional, 
départemental) was introduced in 2007–2009, combined with the functional specialization 
of state field services and related to a repositioning of the prefects. The regional level 
was thus strengthened at the expense of the départemental one. The regional prefect is 
now considered to be the pilot, coordinator and arbitrator in state inter-ministerial 
action. Regional prefects have gained stronger formal powers over the eight merged 
regional units but also over other ministerial services. A new hierarchy was also 
introduced within the prefectoral corps: the regional prefect is now supposed to have 
more authority over the prefects of départements, although the latter have reinforced their 
inter-ministerial powers. This reform has reinforced a hierarchical mode of coordination 
which has been reactivated through the creation of new General Secretariats within the 
main ministries (Chevallier 2005). 
On the other hand, political coordination mechanisms have been reaffirmed. This is 
related primarily to a change in executive relationships. At the level of the political executive, 
the French system granted greater powers to the President. Under President Sarkozy, 
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there has been a "Presidentialization" of the political leadership. These changes in the 
political leadership have been driven by various kinds of dynamic reinforcing political 
modes of coordination and new organizational forms of steering (Bezes and Le Lidec 
2011). Several new organizations have been put under the supervision of the Office of 
the Presidency and are therefore accountable to the President. 
Performance management: favoured vertical modes of coordination 
The way NPM has been introduced in the French context is very different from the 
Norwegian way. Specifically, it has been disconnected from any thinking about the 
organizational restructuring of the state. The 2001 reform of the French budget 
procedure, which introduced performance tools, was passed in the Institutional Act on 
Budget Legislation (LOLF) and implemented in 2006 (Bezes 2010). It was originally 
marked by the adoption of several internationally dominant instruments of performance 
management and articulated in a significant attempt to strengthen the role of Parliament 
in budgetary procedure. The reform was based on a major change in the format and 
content of the Budget, moving away from line-item budgeting towards public policy and 
performance-sensitive frames. The reform drew up a programme budget based on 34 
task forces, corresponding to the French state’s major areas of public policy, and further 
broken down into a set of 132 programmes to which appropriations are allocated. This 
change in the budget format was accompanied by the introduction of a performance 
management structure (Annual Performance Plan and Report). The primary aim was to 
restore the balance of power between Government and Parliament by giving MPs more 
stringent control over budgetary processes and by shaping a new form of accountability 
to Parliament for spending departments.   
This choice favoured the development of managerial instruments based on a 
ministerial specialization. However, given that all the budgeting instruments were to 
frame vertical lines within ministries it also ran counter to all attempts to reinforce 
territorial and inter-ministerial dynamics at the local level. It was decided that all 
programmes should be strictly ministerial. By allocating resources on a ministerial basis 
and by strengthening the existing mechanisms of ministerial centralization, the LOLF 
reinforced the "ministerial pattern" of the French state and modes of coordination 
based on vertical lines, here superimposing a managerial hierarchy on the legal hierarchy 
already existing within the ministerial framework. At the same time, the LOLF 
undermined the territorial-based dimension of the French administration. Specifically, 
the prefects were considerably weakened by a managerial reform that favoured 
ministerial tools and did not offer any horizontal budgetary instruments (Bezes and Le 
Lidec 2011).  
Horizontal de-specialization, specialization and the implications for coordination 
Another reform trend that has recently affected the French administration is related to 
its horizontal form of specialization. The dominant and most systematic move has been 
towards horizontal de-specialization through mergers while some specific cases of 
horizontal specialization of state management tasks have also taken place. From the late 
1990s, state services related to a specific function were given greater autonomy to fulfil 
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operational tasks at a national level and were given the new status of "Offices with 
National Competence". The aim of this process of horizontal specialization was to 
create new specialized agencies at the national level in order to offer increased 
competency and economies of scale and to professionalize the delivery of specific 
managerial tasks within the state. The French Treasury Agency was created in 2001 with 
responsibility for managing the national debt and the Exchequer. Several new 
organizations followed, including a national agency for delivering confidential official 
documents, a national organization for wages, a state property agency and a state 
purchasing service. The creation of these new organizations brought about the 
horizontal specialization of the inter-ministerial, internal and "back office" functions of 
the state.  
In 2007, after the Presidential election of Nicolas Sarkozy and the launching of the 
RGPP, the government decided to carry out a drastic reorganization designed to 
systematically bring about horizontal de-specialization through mergers. First, in the 
new government led by Prime Minister François Fillon in 2007, boundaries between 
ministries were redrawn and the number of full ministers was significantly reduced 
leading to the creation of big meta-ministries. Second, several mergers took place of 
central directorates or central organizations within ministries. In 2008, the creation of 
the "Pole Emploi" involved the merger of two large agencies, respectively in charge of 
employment and benefits. The same year the creation of the General Directorate of 
Public Finances merged two of the oldest departments of the Ministry of Finance: the 
General Directorate of Taxes and the General Directorate of Public Accounting, both 
well known for the importance of their territorial state units. In 2009, a merger between 
the national police belonging to the Ministry of the Interior and the French 
Gendarmerie, a state military force belonging to the Ministry of Defense was initiated, 
whereby the Gendarmerie became attached to the Ministry of the Interior. More 
generally, from 2007, a reduction in the number of central administrative directorates 
took place. Like in Norway, these mergers can be said to gather organizations fulfilling 
"proximate functions" but historically the activities of these organizations have been 
more complementary than similar. Mergers thus appear to be chiefly political decisions 
that give rise to much conflict and resistance. 
The movement towards horizontal de-specialization was reinforced by the 
reorganization through mergers of the territorial state administration, both at the 
regional and the départemental levels, Within the RGPP it was decided to reorganize the 
regional level, merging the twenty-three ministerial regional directorates into eight 
regional directorates whose boundaries match up with those of the new "big ministries". 
At the départmental level, the organization of state services was also tightened by the 
creation of three inter-ministerial Directorates, thus merging the dozen existing 
ministerial directorates at the départemental level and departing from the logic of 
ministerial boundaries. Here, in contrast to the Norwegian case, the majority of mergers 
aimed to internalize conflicts and arbitration between different policy units and their 
specific policy areas and interests and to weaken historical ministry-based specialization. 
Reorganizations designed to bring about horizontal de-specialization can be said to 
have favoured the reinforcement of the political mode of coordination (Bezes and Le 
Lidec 2011). Since the 2000s, the logic of organizational reforms has sought to increase 
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the coordination of public policies within ministries but has also considerably tightened 
political control over ministry activities by having a small number of "super senior civil 
servants" at the central level, thus reinforcing politicization at the territorial level. 
Indeed, reducing the number of central administrative directorates was one requirement 
for strengthening the bonds of trust that the heads of the executive may have with each 
of them. These "super senior civil servants" enjoy more direct relationships, not only 
with their own minister, but also with the Head of State. In short, the rationale for the 
process of reorganization in the 2000s is aimed at having fewer full ministers and fewer 
but more politicized civil servants at the centre with more authority, who are more loyal 
and who report more directly to the Head of Government or even the Head of State 
(Bezes and Le Lidec 2011).  
The political decentralization reforms: A success? 
Contrary to the Norwegian case, decentralization policies have been politically attractive 
for the last thirty years in France and still were in the early 2000s. Supported by local 
politicians and benefiting from their influence on the policy-making system, 
decentralization has remained high on the French political agenda. The approval of a 
new Decentralization Act in 2003/2004, whereby more competencies and 130 000 civil 
servants were transferred from state to regional government, illustrates this fact (Le 
Lidec 2007).  
Like in Norway, however, the idea of rationalizing the structures of regional 
government by merging or reducing the départemental level is still on the presidential 
agenda but is unlikely to succeed because local politicians are acting as strong veto 
players through multiple office-holding and the Senate (Le Lidec, 2009a) has been 
abandoned because it is very unpopular. Political decentralization tends to be supported 
when it is dissociated from the rationalization of local government structures. 
Nevertheless, the decentralization ambitions of Prime Minister Raffarin also faced 
strong ministerial opposition and suffered from his lack of political authority and 
leadership. The initial project envisioned a quasi-federal mode of organizing the French 
State (Le Lidec 2008). Compared to these goals, the achievements have been rather 
limited. The political decentralization of the 2000s also relied on complex and 
ambiguous rationales: while local governments were ready to take on more 
competencies, central government favoured more devolution to local governments but 
without increasing their financial resources. More recently, central government has 
systematically increased its financial control over local authorities. 
Comparative discussion 
Both countries embarked on NPM reforms later than many other Western countries. 
Although they have both been afflicted with reorganization fever, each has followed a 
distinct mode of reform and a different structuring pattern. A major difference between 
the French and the Norwegian reforms is that the French reforms have recently become 
more radical and comprehensive, while the Norwegian reforms are more hesitant. 
Another major difference between Norway and France is that while many of the major 
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reforms in Norway are typically sector-specific reforms, such as the hospital reform or 
the welfare administration reform, the French reforms have more systematically pursued 
cross-sectoral and overarching goals.  
 The pattern of reforms has also been different. The Norwegian reforms have 
favoured vertical specialization and specialization by sector, as exemplified by the 
hospital reform and the reorganization of the immigration administration. To some 
extent, this has reinforced the historical tradition of the Norwegian administration – i.e. 
its strong vertical specialization in silos – while introducing some new directions. This 
trend has served to highlight the problems of horizontal coordination. NPM 
instruments such as performance management or attempts to reinforce political control 
have been used to counter-balance the trend towards more vertical segmentation. Path-
breaking trends – reforms aimed at increasing vertical specialization from the state to 
the local authorities via decentralization and mergers – such as the regional reform, or 
reforms challenging sector-based specialization such as the reorganization of internal 
security, have been rather limited and unsuccessful. Reforms addressing horizontal 
specialization have been more successful in cases where they are able to operate within a 
broad ministerial portfolio, such as the welfare administration.  
Table 3: Comparing Contemporary Administrative Reforms  
 France Norway 
Modes of 
change  
Reluctant reformer until the early 2000s. 
NPM influence from the mid-1990s to the 
2000s. Incremental reforms (1997–2004) 
Structural and systematic change in 2007–
2009 based on mergers.  
A reluctant reformer until the mid- 
1990s. More eager NPM reformer until 
2005. Then post-NPM-oriented 
reforms related to problems in specific 
sectors.  
Vertical 
specialization 
Vertical specialization through 
decentralization and sporadically through 
the creation of agencies in specific policy 
sectors. Some vertical de-specialization by 
reducing the départemental level.  
Reinforcement of historical vertical 
specialization – Moving politics out by 
agencification. Then attempts at 
vertical de-specialization  
Performance 
management 
A budget-focus reform disconnected from 
agency and restructuring perspectives 
Management-by-Objectives-and-
Results is a strong feature from mid-
1990s, strengthening central control. 
Horizontal 
specialization 
Systematic horizontal de-specialization 
within all sector-based ministries and for 
policy-delivery functions Horizontal 
specialization for managerial tasks  
A mix of horizontal de-specialization 
for organizations fulfilling "similar" 
tasks and of horizontal specialization 
by splitting different functions fulfilled 
within the same organization.  
Decentrali-
zation 
reforms 
Success of decentralization reforms but 
recently more central control  
Failure of decentralization reforms  
Coordination 
and political 
control 
Reaffirmation of hierarchical mechanisms 
of coordination (between administrative 
levels) + Reinforcement of political 
mechanisms of coordination through 
increased politicization + bringing politics 
back in. 
Increased problems of coordination 
due to an increase in vertical 
specialization – Creation of a special 
minister for inter-ministerial 
coordination – Attempts to increase 
political control 
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By contrast, the French reform pattern has predominantly favoured vertical 
specialization by decentralization and a late but systematic horizontal de-specialization 
through mergers. Vertical specialization through agencification has remained gradual, 
and has mainly taken place in policy sectors where political blame is likely to occur. 
Both systems have faced big challenges regarding horizontal coordination, but these 
issues have been addressed differently by France and Norway. In France inter-
ministerial coordination has been more up front. It is significant that existing modes of 
coordination, hierarchical but also political, have been reactivated but also redirected. 
Nevertheless, in both countries negative coordination remains more common than 
positive coordination. 
Exp l a i n i ng  D i ve rgences  i n  Re f o rm  S t y l e  and  
O rgan i z a t i ona l  Cho i c e s  
There is no one factor explaining change in the structural anatomy of the Norwegian 
and French state apparatus. To understand and explain the reform trajectories in the 
two countries, we will apply a transformative approach which regards reform processes 
as a complex mixture of external pressure (financial crises, budgetary difficulties, 
internationally dominant administrative doctrines, institutional environment), polity factors 
and domestic historical–institutional legacies that constrain the initiatives and the leeway of 
political and administrative executives when committing into active administrative 
reform policies (Christensen and Lægreid 2001; see also Bezes and le Lidec 2009).  
We will here combine explanatory factors and try to identify how they interact. Our 
argument is that the way these factors are combined and their modes of 
interdependence differ between the two countries. More specifically, we will address the 
importance of institutional and polity features, in line with our theoretical approach. 
Two broad questions will be addressed. First, what explains the differences between the 
two reform styles? Second, what explains the dominant Norwegian preference for more 
vertical specialization and no decentralization while France has favoured horizontal de-
specialization with political decentralization?  
Exp l a i n i ng  d i f f e r en ce s  i n  r e f o rm  s t y l e s :  c omb in i ng  
po l i t y  and  i n s t i t u t i ona l  f a c t o r s  
A first significant difference to explain is the administrative reform style and the fact 
that while major reforms were sector-specific, pragmatic and gradually implemented in 
Norway; organizational reforms were blocked for a long time in France but then 
became radical and cross-sectoral. Here, the historical ties, polity features and 
institutional administrative arrangements that characterize the Norwegian and the 
French states can be cited to explain how change has occurred in each country over the 
last two decades.  
In Norway, the style of administrative policy reforms corresponds with the general 
Norwegian policy-making style of peaceful coexistence and "revolution in slow motion" 
based on common interests and consensus (Olsen, Roness and Sætren 1982). Norway 
seems to have adjusted to the new international trend of administrative reforms and to 
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the specific problems generated by its organization in a pragmatic, incremental and 
cautious manner. The multi-party system, minority governments and proportional 
representation in multi-member electoral districts tends to result in negotiation whereby 
support is sought from different parties on an issue-by-issue basis. The balance of 
power is therefore favorable to the Parliament (Storting), with numerous parties involved 
in finding a compromise on policy issues. In line with the established political–
administrative culture in Norway, the concrete reform measures can be interpreted as a 
political cooperation process of finding solutions that are administratively and politically 
reasonable, appropriate and possible in the light of opposing views and demands. The 
Norwegian state is used to coping with changes in its institutional environment through 
a process of permanent adaptation and long-term budgetary planning in the context of a 
balanced budget. This seems to reflect high levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes 
and norms among political and administrative leaders, within the public sector in general 
and in the relationship between the central and local authorities in particular 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2005)  
As illustrated by the reform of the welfare administration, administrative 
reorganizations are usually long-term processes where the diagnosis of the problem and 
the calling in of expertise to solve it are subject to discussion, debate and iterations. The 
historical legacy of a governmental model of ministerial rule has also clearly affected 
changes in the formal organizational structure of central government in Norway. 
Norway’s model of ministerial administration is based on the principle that a minister 
can be held responsible for any decision made by the part of the administration he or 
she controls. The existence of strong sector ministries and a government administration 
ministry with weak horizontal coordinative power means that reform processes are 
more often driven by sector-specific initiatives than by government-initiated 
comprehensive and binding general reform programs. In Norway, the polity features 
seem to reinforce the institutional segmentation of the administrative system and 
explain why the major reforms were driven by sector specific issues, demands and 
problems. Compared to the overarching reforms, the sector-specific reforms have been 
bigger and more comprehensive. It is obviously easier to implement radical reforms 
within each sector than across sectors. 
In France, administrative reform policy style is informed by a more elitist 
administrative culture and a more confrontational policy-making style where long 
periods of institutional inertia alternate with radical, sudden and disruptive reforms. On 
the one hand, the French semi-presidential system and the use of majority electoral rule 
gives the executive, and specifically the government, the power and authority to take 
unilateral action at the policy formulation stage, without a specific need for prior 
consultation with stakeholders, a "statist pattern of policymaking" (Schmidt 1996:46). 
This policy style has been traditionally described as a "heroic" (Hayward 1973) or a 
"crisis-related" (Crozier 1963) mode of change and is associated with certain French 
polity features. It relies on a combination of strong political leadership, small circles of 
"functionally politicized" top bureaucrats serving the government who have spent time 
in diverse departments or in the private sector and asymmetrical relations between the 
Parliament and the Executive in favour of the latter, which exerts control over the 
political agenda. This mode of change has been observed on several occasions in 
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administrative reform policies and usually leads to confrontation at the implementation 
stage (Bezes 2001, 2009).  
That said, however, this is just one aspect of the French process, which is more often 
dominated by periods of "institutional inertia" (Hayward 1976) characterized by strong 
institutions and considerable interdependence and accommodation due to the 
constraining influence of veto-players. Organizational reforms in the French context 
have been embedded in the multi-tiered system of French administrative organization, 
whereby two strongly competing but interlinked patterns – territorial and sector-based 
forms of vertical specialization – are combined. The French system is a complex nexus 
of interlinked and institutionalized relationships between central administrations, state 
regional units within ministries, prefects, regional authorities and the political executive 
(Le Lidec 2006, Bezes 2010) with access to and power over the national decision-
making process in which locally elected representatives (presidents of departmental or 
regional councils) benefit from institutional positions at the centre (multiple office-
holding) (Le Lidec 2008). For ministries, reforming the structures of their central 
administrations will generate side-effects on their territorial ministerial organization that 
will limit their initiatives. In addition ministries often find it difficult to reform their 
territorial ministerial organization on an autonomous sector-specific basis because the 
proposed reorganization conflicts with the interests and conceptions of the prefects, 
who defend the territorial state.  
This dual and competing supervision of the territorial state units (vertical/sector-
based/ministerial and horizontal/territorial/prefectoral) explains why before 2007 
sector-based ministerial initiatives were always designed on an ad hoc and experimental 
basis with limited effects. Finally, local governments often oppose reorganizations of 
ministerial territorial units because they are likely to reduce public jobs in their 
respective geographical areas. Because all reorganizational issues are linked and 
interdependent, reform design, when it emerges, is more likely to be cross-ministerial 
and transversal than sector-based. This is all the more likely as centripetal and centralist 
administrative actors – the Finance, Interior/Home Office and Civil Service ministries – 
are more powerful actors (Bezes 2007) in the French context than their corresponding 
ministries in the Norwegian system. These actors are eager to impose their transversal 
and general views on the whole system.  
To sum up, reorganization negotiations involve many actors, each defending distinct 
interests and strategies and each having the potential to be a veto player. This generally 
results in everyday lowest-common-denominator reforms, with limited implementation 
and uncertain impact. Veto actors are numerous and transaction costs are high due to 
the strong horizontal and vertical specialization of the state. The result at the level of 
everyday policy is usually more incremental reforms or even institutional inertia, because 
the political costs are high and politicians usually want to avoid blame for organizational 
matters. When change does occur, like it did in 2007, this reflects the presence of a 
strong political leadership but this situation is rare.  
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E xp l a i n i ng  o rgan i z a t i ona l  c ho i c e s :  c omb in i ng  
po l i t i c a l ,  i n s t i t u t i ona l  and  env i r onmen ta l  f a c t o r s  
The second set of evidence to be explained concerns the global patterns of 
organizational change and the choices related to these. Why did Norwegian reformers 
dominantly and continuously favour the reinforcement of vertical specialization with 
some de-specialization for specific sectors (hospitals) but no overall political 
decentralization while French reformers mostly favoured horizontal de-specialization, 
political decentralization and some vertical specialization in specific sectors? None of 
these complex forms of change strictly mirror the historical traditions of organization so 
the mechanical "path-dependency" argument cannot be applied here. Rather, the 
explanation lies in specific combinations of policy-driving factors, external pressure and 
institutional constraints in each country.  
In the Norwegian case, political factors and the influence of NPM and of institutions 
favoured the option of more vertical specialization. The first main explanatory factor is 
political. Both before and after 2005, politicians were key actors in putting reform issues 
on the political agenda. While before 2005 the Centre–Right government was a rather 
eager NPM reformer, after the Red–Green coalition was elected in 2005, the 
government became much more sceptical vis-à-vis new NPM reforms without wanting 
to turn the clock back to the pre-NPM period. In the welfare administration, the 
parliament was a main initiator of reform, deciding on its main components while the 
responsible minister also played a key role. In the hospital reform and also the 
regulatory reform, the responsible ministers were the key reform agents. The recent 
reforms of the immigration administration were also heavily influenced by the political 
executive.  
Although differences exist between the Bondevik II government’s enthusiasm for 
NPM and the skepticism of the Centre–Left government towards NPM (specifically 
expressed in the extent of corporatization), there is no major cleavage between the 
different governments regarding the reform process. None of the reforms have been 
reversed by incoming governments, and indeed, many of the major reforms have been 
decided on by one government and implemented by the next government without any 
big changes being made. This applies to the hospital reform and the welfare 
administration reform. The adoption of this "continuity" option reveals that, generally 
speaking, Norwegian political reformers have no problem with installing existing or new 
organizations at arms’ length from the political executive, thus reinforcing the distance 
between them and the more autonomous agencies. Politicians in Norway do not 
consider more vertical specialization to present major or insoluble problems of control. 
In general, they do not fear losing their capacity to intervene in the day-to-day 
functioning and management of their services. Of course, there have been cases where 
changes in the political leadership or partisan majorities or the specifics of some 
politically sensitive policies may generate greater concerns about political control. This 
was the case with respect to immigration policy, for instance.  
The new 2005 government has also generally been more reluctant to launch new 
major reforms, and in its overall reform program labelled "An administration for 
democracy and community" has signalled an increased interest in post-NPM reform 
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initiatives focusing on democratic participation, horizontal coordination and integration 
in the administrative apparatus (Christensen and Lægreid 2010b). However, the 
dominant trend is that entrusting autonomous agencies with responsibilities for public 
policy does not represent an unusual political choice in the Norwegian context. One 
reason for this is that there is a high level of mutual trust between central agencies and 
ministries and also between political and administrative executives. Besides, the fact that 
electoral campaigns in Norway are collectively defined and held according to 
proportional representation, so that parties rather than individual politicians compete 
with one another, does not make political control a salient problem.  
A number of other factors reinforced this orientation towards vertical specialization. 
It is hard to see reform as only home grown, since a lot of inspiration and learning is 
derived from abroad with reform ideas diffused from one country to another, but these 
processes are often rather complicated. Even though neither Norway nor France were 
NPM front-runners the reforms they have implemented still bear the stamp of 
international reform movements, especially more recent reforms. In Norway NPM ideas 
and later post-NPM ideas coming from abroad are obviously part of the story. 
Examples of this are structural devolution, regulatory reforms, and the ideas of single-
purpose organizations and performance management systems. These NPM ideas, which 
reinforce vertical specialization, were specifically compatible with the historical 
organization of the Norwegian state so that reforms were likely to be implemented 
quickly. Another argument is that because the NPM performance management recipe 
was simultaneously adopted it offered a positive counter-balance, in terms of control, to 
increased vertical specialization.  
The budgetary situation did not represent a constraint on increased governance at 
distance either, even though this could potentially generate an increase in public 
expenditure. Norway is a prosperous country with a healthy economy and a high 
standard of living. Its management of oil assets by the government Pension Fund – 
Global is an example of long-term budgetary planning. Owing to its small population 
and huge revenues from offshore oil and gas, Norway has experienced less budgetary 
pressure than many other European countries and hence the pressure for cut-backs and 
savings has been weaker in Norway. Besides, vertical specialization was also compatible 
with the historical configuration of veto players and was supported by the state 
employees’ unions (Roness 2001) in line with the strong corporative tradition in Norway 
and the participatory model of modernization in the Nordic countries.  
From this perspective, how can we explain the case for horizontal de-specialization 
(welfare), vertical de-specialization (hospitals) and the failure of political 
decentralization? Our argument is that these changes occurred when one of the three 
converging factors was distinctly oriented. As previously said, the financial crisis had no 
obvious general effect on the reforms. Most of the reforms started before the global 
crisis occurred, and Norway’s healthy financial situation meant that the public sector 
reform process was not affected by it to any significant extent. However, in sectors 
where budgetary problems arose, distinct organizational changes were introduced. One 
of the main arguments behind the hospital reform was to gain (political) control over 
the budget deficit and over the galloping and uncontrolled expenditure on health care. 
This explains why vertical de-specialization (from local governments to the state) was 
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preferred (but linked to vertical specialization from the state to publicly owned 
enterprises.) Financial arguments and issues of political control were also important in 
the welfare administration reform and explain why horizontal de-specialization was the 
preferred option here. The failure of political decentralization is compatible with our 
argument about Norwegian politicians’ espousal of management of public policy by 
autonomous administrations. Political decentralization would amount to entrusting 
regionally elected politicians and complex partisan majorities with public policy. Hence, 
for political reasons this has not been the dominant approach chosen in Norway in the 
recent period.  
Contrary to their Norwegian counterparts, French political reformers have been 
consistently reluctant to support organizational choices devolving functions to 
authorities further away from political control. Significantly, the various official 
commissions for reforming the state, created in the 1990s, never strongly advocated the 
idea of differentiating the French administration into autonomous administrative units 
or agencies (Bezes 2007) while other NPM recipes were more popular. Generally 
speaking, French politicians have been hostile to every organizational change likely to 
decrease their political control. This could be explained by several institutional 
mechanisms in the French context: the domination of the executive, strong 
individualization of political careers linked to extensive use of the single-member district 
system (Le Lidec 2009b), stronger political uncertainty than in Norway, lower level of 
mutual trust between administrative organizations at different levels and between 
political and administrative executives and the historical and long-lasting use of 
politicization and centralization mechanisms. All these elements have historically 
favoured the development of structures that maximize capacity for political control, for 
individual casework and servicing voters. Agencies have mainly been created in policy 
sectors where risks were high (health, etc.) due to uncertain expertise and where 
politicians were likely to be blamed.  
In other situations, French reformers have been very reluctant to relinquish their 
capacity to intervene in ordinary, day-to-day policy. This explains why vertical 
specialization was developed on an ad hoc rather than a systematic basis. It is hence not 
surprising that horizontal de-specialization through mergers was the favoured option. 
From a political point of view, mergers at the central and regional levels have 
considerably tightened control over ministerial activities by creating a small and reduced 
number of leading positions and "super senior civil servants" whose task is to 
implement the goals pursued by the political executive (Bezes and Le Lidec 2011). 
These "super senior civil servants" enjoy more direct relationships, not only with their 
own minister, but also with the Head of State. In short, fewer full ministers, fewer 
senior civil servants at the centre. Horizontal de-specialization through mergers is likely 
to reinforce politicization and political control. What is more, the design of the mergers 
intends to internalize conflicts and arbitration within the new big entities. Positive 
coordination and the resolution of conflicts between public policies is then more likely 
to be strengthened within macro-ministries and directorates, thus forcing them to make 
political choices between contradictory alternatives. The purpose of merging here is to 
reduce ambiguities and internalize political choices.  
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This political factor in favour of horizontal de-specialization was reinforced by 
external pressures. In France, the growing deficit and debt as well as European pressure 
from 2004 to 2007 highlighted the objective of reducing public expenditure and lent it 
more political weight. These budgetary problems have led to major reorganizations of 
the public sector and the architecture of the state, which have been advocated as a way 
of downsizing and achieving economies of scale. The RGPP systematized these aims 
and evolved a government policy dedicated to scrutinizing how resources in the 
administration could be better used. The RGPP claimed to be "rethinking the state" as a 
way of tackling the fiscal imperatives of reducing the debt and the deficit and realizing 
the two-fold objectives of downsizing government and implementing managerial-style 
reforms intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient (Bezes and Le Lidec 2009).  
Organizational mergers involving both central directorates and state field units, and 
the promotion of the regional level as the main level for steering and coordinating 
public policy have been defended as an "efficient form" with a twofold purpose. 
Mergers are likely to generate a significant decrease in the number of state public agents, 
specifically by reducing the important number of "front office agents" in local 
ministerial units at the departmental level. In addition, the supremacy of the regional 
level over the département state units may allow significant economies of scale to be made 
by merging back-office functions in such areas as finance, IT support and human 
resources management but also in policy-oriented functions requiring specific expertise. 
This call for mergers and horizontal de-specialization was supported by consultancy 
firms, which have played a major role as producers and disseminators of "structural 
reform" standards since the early 2000s. The growing influence of their rationalizing and 
"cost-killing" recipes has been recognized (Berrebi-Hoffmann and Grémion 2009, Bezes 
and Le Lidec 2009). In the French context mergers are thus "ambiguous" organizational 
solutions likely to be adopted as a result of "ambiguous agreement" (Palier 2005). A 
precise analysis of the different positions adopted towards mergers shows that the 
various reformers involved agree on them but for very different, often contradictory, 
reasons. Mergers are expected to achieve economies, to favour reinforced political 
control and also to offer a response to the French problems of coordination.  
In this perspective, the case for horizontal specialization only refers to situations 
where the objective was to make specific tasks within the state more efficient and 
professional through rationalization and the creation of specifically allocated units. The 
success of political decentralization – and hence of increased vertical but political 
specialization – confirms the specificity of the French organizational trend. Political 
decentralization transfers responsibility for public policy and related political arbitration 
from central to local government, thus illustrating French government concern to 
reinforce political control over policy and its hostility towards solutions where public 
policy is entrusted to autonomous administrative organizations/agencies.  
Conclusion  
The reform cases analyzed in this paper show diverse reform processes in which several 
driving forces supplement and complement one another and in combination explain 
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reform trajectories. Rather than an either-or explanation we need to combine different 
explanatory factors. Reform outcomes cannot be explained in terms of single features – 
be they home-grown reforms, sectoral challenges, diffusion and learning from abroad, 
adaptation to the financial crisis and budget deficit, or free choice by powerful political 
executives – but only by a combination of such features. Another theoretical lesson is 
that in trying to rearrange the historical structure of sectoral and territorial 
specialization, reform processes introduce a balance of autonomy and integration 
elements. The discussion has revealed that we need to treat autonomy and integration 
and specialization and coordination as mutually dependent processes. This argument of 
co-evolution and mutually dependent processes in multi-level governance is well known 
in the literature on integration and autonomy in the European Union (Egeberg 2004, 
Olsen 2004), on autonomy and control in the field of administrative reform (Verhoerst 
et al. 2004) and on the relationship between specialization and coordination (Bouckaert, 
Peters and Verhoest 2010).  
What can be learned from these findings about the evolution of coordination and 
specialization in the modern state both in a comparative perspective and in more general 
theoretical terms? A first lesson concerns the effects of globalization and the financial 
crisis. One might have expected external pressure, NPM diffusion and institutional 
choices to have resulted in convergence towards similar organizational forms or at least 
similar trends of reorganization. There are two reasons why this is not the case. Firstly, 
the two countries have not faced the same pressures: the financial crisis imposed strong 
constraints in France, offering a window of opportunity to reorganize and amplify 
existing and available solutions rather than generating new directions in reorganizing 
trends; this was not the case in Norway. Secondly, the two countries have not 
systematically adopted the same reorganizational recipes. General conclusions 
advocating convergence or divergence (Pollitt 2007) are too broad to successfully 
explain the diverse empirical realities and the operating trends. Our comparative 
perspective emphasizes the need to make distinctions between elements of convergence 
and divergence. While both countries experienced a renewal of control through 
managerial tools, it is remarkable that French reformers predominantly focused on 
horizontal de-specialization while Norwegian governments tended to favour vertical 
specialization. In a schematic way, the Norwegian administration favoured intra-sectoral 
reforms reaffirming ministerial silos with a managerial counter-balance while the French 
state gave priority to inter-sectoral reforms aimed at weakening ministerial logic and 
reintroducing coordination issues. At first glance, these dominant trends seem to be 
"path-dependent", with the Norwegian state reaffirming its historical vertical 
specialization while the French state has hybridized its two structural patterns of 
specialization – territorial and sector-based.  
A second lesson relates to the changing organization of the modern state. The first 
trend of reorganization identified, strongly influenced by Anglo-American countries, has 
been the idea of increased fragmentation of the state through increased vertical 
specialization. Our two cases show that while vertical specialization does constitute an 
organizational recipe it is neither necessarily the dominant one (in France) nor 
systematically implemented for all ministries and all related policy issues (in Norway). 
The picture is more complex and our analysis emphasizes the importance of horizontal 
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de-specialization as a strong reorganizing trend. Some have labeled it a post-NPM trend 
and see it as a reaction to, or even a reversal of, previous NPM reforms and their 
unintended and undesirable effects. The empirical findings in this paper help to open 
the "black box" of horizontal de-specialization by identifying four rationales. First, 
merging units may be a response to problems of coordination, although neither in 
France nor in Norway were these issues of coordination exclusively provoked by NPM 
reforms. Second, horizontal de-specialization is also a way to cut public expenditure by 
downsizing and achieving economies of scale in times of budgetary crisis (France) or in 
policy sectors where these problems are relevant (Norway). Third, in some contexts, 
mergers also reflect a political strategy to regain political control by strengthening 
hierarchies. This has been the case in France at a general level and in Norway in specific 
policy sectors (immigration for instance) where issues of political control were sensitive.  
A last lesson would suggest that all public organizations have faced a common 
pattern of reorganization with a renewed division between front office and back office 
and distinct trends of reorganization for each level. For front-office delivery tasks, 
horizontal de-specialization has been the dominant design for change geared to 
downsizing and building a front-line "one stop shop". This has been observed, for 
instance, within the welfare organization in Norway and is an ongoing trend at the 
départemental level in France where local state units have been reorganized. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, reorganizations of back-office functions have followed a 
global trend of increased specialization aimed at enhancing professionalism. Here 
Norway has been more systematic than France, accepting the specialization of all kinds 
of functions including regulatory ones. By contrast, French politicians have been 
consistently opposed to reorganizations likely to weaken their political control. Distinct 
combinations of polity and political and institutional features explain these differences.  
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